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Abstract:
In this paper we provide a brief summary and evaluation of the main economic changes or
‘reforms’ undertaken by the Cuban government during the 1990's.  The thrust of our argument is that
the regime does not seem to be interested in reforms that lead to a transition to a market economy or
even in the more limited goal of introducing widespread market mechanisms subservient to the needs of
the communist party as in China.  Instead, their policies seem directed at generating mechanisms for the
appropriation of foreign exchange by members of the nomenclature while keeping most citizens
deprived of independent access to wealth creation activities.  We develop our argument by looking
separately at ‘reforms’ in two type of markets: those in which transactions are self-enforcing and those
which depend on the contract enforcement mechanisms or services usually associated with market
augmenting government to enforce transactions.
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           government.By most accounts the process of economic reform in Cuba starts in 1993.  In these six years
this process has evolved in various directions, not all of them consistent with each other, and economic
outcomes have also evolved in various ways sometimes due to the reforms and at other times despite
the reforms.  An evaluation of this process requires some brief background on both the Cuban
economy and the nature of markets, which is provided immediately below.  Afterwards, we will
address two fundamental aspects of any reform process.  What are the goals of the reforms?  What is
the impact of the reforms on economic activities in the two types of markets we identify below?
I.  Background.
With the Fall of the Wall in 1989, the Cuban economy went into a precipitous decline in
economic activity, measured by GDP, which lasted until 1993.  Since 1993 there has been increasing
growth in GDP from 1994 to 1996 followed by decreasing growth in GDP in 1997 and 1998, see
Everleny Perez-Villanueva (1998, Fig 1, p.2).  Furthermore, the substantial  decline of the early 90's
came on the heels of a deceleration in the growth of internal economic activity associated with the
Rectification Process, Betancourt (1993).  Indeed, some knowledgeable insiders have argued that the
process of decline in the economy started in 1983,  Roque Cabello and Sanchez Herrero (1998).   We
will argue that the recovery from 1994-1996 was associated with policies that allow markets to expand
and the decline in growth since 1996 is associated with policy measures that lead to a contraction in
market activities.  
To support our argument, it is useful to review an essential point about the functioning of
markets: these institutions can be split into two types according to the dramatically different role that the1For a detail discussion of this issue see Betancourt(1998).
state plays in these markets.1  In the first type of markets, where transactions are self-enforcing, the
state plays a limited role which can be characterized primarily as providing law and order and a medium
of exchange.  In the second type of markets, where transactions are not self-enforcing, the state plays a
more pervasive but subtle role that has been labeled market augmenting government by Olson (1998). 
In addition to law and order and a medium of exchange, the state has to provide contract enforcement
mechanisms in this second type of markets.  The most typical and important among these mechanisms is
an independent judiciary, but a host of other governmental and nongovernmental institutions also
contribute to the functioning of these markets.  
Other institutions that support the development of the second type of markets include specific
organizations, which supply arbitration, supervision and regulation services, as well as societal norms or
rules of conduct, for example freedom of association and freedom of the press.  For instance, freedom
of association allows the creation of credit bureaus and better business bureaus that enhance the
operation of reputation effects in generating the fulfillment of contracts.  Similarly, freedom of the press
allows the dissemination of information on successes or failures in the fulfillment of contracts. 
Moreover, both of these societal norms play an indispensable role in the transmission of knowledge as
a public good that is intrinsic to the flourishing of many markets in innovations, ranging from Aids
vaccines to business formats.  
In general markets of the first type evolve on their own unless governments actively repress
them while markets of the second type are unlikely to exist or operate at a high level of transactions
unless the fabric of institutions in a society, including governmental activities and policies, provides ahospitable environment.  In evaluating Cuba’s ‘reforms’ we will differentiate between these two types
of markets and the effects of the ‘reforms’ on their functioning.     
II. What are the Goals of the Economic ‘Reforms’?
In many if not most countries, the process of economic reform has as its stated goal the
development of a market economy. What happens in practice can take many forms, since capitalist
countries offer a wide variety of alternatives under the so-called mixed market economy model. 
Nonetheless, the basic thrust of a move toward a market economy is paid at the very least lip service
by the political or regime leaders of most economies in a transition toward a market economy.  It is
difficult to argue seriously that the goal of Cuba’s economic ‘reforms’ is the development of a market
economy.  Fidel Castro repeatedly denies such earthly objectives.  Indeed this January, at a conference
on globalization sponsored by the Cuban government, Fidel took pride in making two announcements:
his lack of knowledge of economics and his belief in the imminent demise of the capitalist system.  In
any event, it is infantile to pretend that such public statements by the leader of a country are consistent
with any serious attempt at economic reforms that develop a market economy, especially when such a
leader enjoys the unlimited power over his subjects that Fidel Castro does.
There are two countries where the objective of the economic reforms has been limited quite
publicly and openly, namely Vietnam and China.  In these two countries the leaders of the countries
have espoused the development of a market economy subject to its subordination to the preeminent
role of the Communist Party in the political arena.   Cuba is not following their path  in terms of the
public declarations of its highest ranking leaders, or more importantly in terms of the reform measures2For a comparison of the announced reforms in Cuba and Vietnam see Quijano (1996); for a
comparison of the reforms in Cuba and China see Perez-Lopez (1998).
3Variants of this argument have been put forth by others as well. In particular see Locay
(1998), who evaluated the reforms as they existed in 1995 and whose interpretation seems to have
been borne out by subsequent events.
adopted.2  While in Cuba there are expressions of sympathy for what these two countries are trying to
do and Castro visited both in late 1995, these sympathetic expressions are usually accompanied by
statements that whatever reforms from these two countries are emulated they do not imply a return to
capitalism or a transition to a market economy. 
At the core of the Chinese reforms are two institutional changes, started from below and
appropriated by the leadership, that dramatically altered the economic incentive systems facing the
majority of the population: namely, the development of the household responsibility system in 1979 and
the development of town and village enterprises in the 1980's. The former change eliminated an
important element in the suppression of agricultural markets; the latter change made these enterprises
residual claimants to the outcomes of their activities in an environment of interjurisdictional competition. 
These two institutional changes constituted a dramatic improvement in the distribution of economic
opportunities available to China’s population. No set of ‘reforms’ in Cuba provides similar economic
incentives to the majority of the population.
What are then the goals of the Cuban economic ‘reform’ process?  I would argue that it is the
preservation of Castro and the ‘nomenclature’ in power, given as small a move toward a market
economy as required for the survival of the regime.3  To buttress my argument I will rely on a Cuban
economist from the island who makes a similar point, perhaps unwittingly.  In his conclusion to a paper
presented last Fall Everleny Perez-Villanueva (1998) argues that the strategic design of the futureshould aim not at survival but to the search for real growth alternatives, but adds at the end -- logically
this should be done within the framework of the system that has been set-up over the last forty years.  
The practical import of the caveat at the end is to generate a great similarity between his statement and
mine.     
III.  What is the Impact of the Economic ‘Reforms’ on Economic Activities in Markets with Self-       
Enforcing Transactions?
 Perhaps the most important economic reform undertaken in Cuba has been allowing the U.S.
dollar to be used as legal tender since 1993.  This provides a most attractive medium of exchange for
all transactions and for all types of markets, including markets with self-enforcing transactions.  Just as
most command economies in the past, Cuba provides reasonably high levels of law and order in the
standard sense of limiting petty crime.   Hence, one would expect markets with self-enforcing
transactions to do well in Cuba.  The most important among these markets in Cuba are the agricultural
or farmers’ markets,  the market for self-employment services, other  legal retail markets such as dollar
stores, the market for prostitution services and other illegal retail transactions.
Self-employment was allowed in about 100 occupations in 1993, restaurants were  allowed up
to a limit of 12 chairs in 1994 and professionals were allowed to participate in self-employment in
1995, as long as it was not in the profession where they received their training.   Since 1995 a number
of repressive measures have been undertaken against these activities.  A particularly telling example is
the rental of rooms to tourists, which is now subjected to confiscatory taxation in the form of  levying a
tax based on a 100 % occupancy rate over the year that has to be paid regardless of the actual
occupancy rate.  Not surprisingly, the number of registered and approved self employed peaked at
208,786 in December of 1995 and declined to 159,506 by January of 1998, Ritter (1998).4 A recent discussion of their situation can be found in Nova Gonzalez(1998).
5If the intent of the restriction is to prevent these markets from growing because it threatens the
hold on power of the regime, it makes sense from this limited viewpoint; if the restriction has some other
aim supposed to be consistent with the growth of these markets, it is a revelation of profound ignorance
on how these markets evolve. The first interpretation is far more plausible than the second.
Farmers’ markets (and artisan markets as well) were legally allowed in the Fall of 1994. 
The main suppliers of these agricultural products were expected to be the new agricultural cooperatives
UBPC and small farmers belonging to ANAP.  More recently, an independent association of small
farmers (ANAIC) who participate in these markets has arisen.  The UBPC’s have not been as
successful as anticipated due to the restrictions under which they operate.4 For instance, they are
required to sell given amounts to the state at prices imposed by the state, plant the seeds recommended
by the state, etc.  After that they can produce for themselves or for the farmers’ markets.  Their
contribution to the supply of agricultural products in the farmers’ markets has been estimated as going
from 15% in 1994 to 4.8% in 1997, Nova Gonzalez (1998).  
An important restriction in the development of the farmers’ markets are the prohibitions of
participation by intermediaries.  In the immense majority of cases it is inefficient for small farmers’ to
have to sell their products themselves at these locations, but there seems to be a fundamental bias
against the role of intermediaries in this economic activity on the part of the Cuban leadership. 
Inveighing against these intermediaries became one of Fidel’s favorite pastimes at the beginning of the
Rectification Process and continues unabated.5  Small farmers members of ANAIC have complained in
1999  of persecution by government authorities through news and articles by the Association of 
Independent Journalists that appear weekly in Cubanet <http://www.cubanet.org/centro.html> .  In any
event, the private supply of agricultural products to the farmers’ markets went from 42% in 1994 to 506Incidentally part of that supply is extracted from the UBPC’s, which lowers their incentives to
produce.
% in 1997, Nova Gonzalez (1998).
A plausible interpretation of what is happening in the farmers’ markets is an attempt by the
government to control the supply to the market without lowering output by agricultural producers, but
this is a difficult trick to perform.  For instance, Nova Gonzalez (1998) reports that the share of supply
of agricultural products provided by the government in these markets went from 24% in 1994 to 41%
in 1997. 6  Nonetheless, he also reports a decline in the total amounts of both agricultural products and
meat products available through these markets in 1997.
It is more difficult to assess what is going on in illegal retail markets or black markets, including
the one for prostitution services.  In the latter one, we know that an attitude of benign neglect prior to
1995 was replaced by a hostile attitude after a 1995 speech by Fidel condemning the activity.
Complaints of harassment by the authorities in their attempts to repress prostitution surface periodically
in Cubanet.  Nonetheless travelers  consistently report that the ‘jineteras’ are plentifully available,
especially in Havana. 
Last but not least is the dollar stores retail market controlled by the government.  Direct
information on these markets is not available.  One reason may be that these markets provide an
important  mechanism for the government to capture dollars from several sources: the members of
population who receive remittances or who engage in illegal activities, tourists and any others who
acquire dollars.  For instance, by charging a high price in dollars for the commodities sold at these
stores the government captures the difference between the sales price and the dollar cost of obtaining
the commodity per unit.    These dollar stores sales are likely to be partly responsible for an inconsistency that seems to
exist in the official statistics.  If one looks at the figures for retail trade provided in the Anuario
Estadistico de Cuba for 1996, one finds that the highest rate of growth of retail sales per capita is the
year 1993-1994 with the rate of growth declining in every subsequent year up to the last period for
which data is available, 1996-1997.  The sales figures are in pesos per capita. These figures are
inconsistent with the growth picture that emerges from looking at GDP quoted earlier.  Part of the
explanation may be that sales in legal dollar stores are converted into pesos at the official  exchange rate
(1:1) rather than at the market exchange rate (about 1:20).   
Summing up,  the policy measures adopted and the pronouncements made since 1995 would
be expected to have serious negative effects on the functioning of markets with self-enforcing
transactions and they have had precisely this effect.  The only exception to this general assessment may
be the dollar stores retail market where the government gets the lion’s share of the profits in dollars. 
IV. What is the Impact of the Economic ‘Reforms’ on Economic Activities in Markets Where        
Transactions are Not Self-Enforcing?
In this second type of markets one finds most of the markets that make-up a modern economy,
for example financial markets, skilled labor services markets, and markets for investments and
innovations.  Just as in other command style economies these markets are relatively underdeveloped in
Cuba.  Reforms in these markets have focused on foreign investment and activities related to this
sector.
With respect to financial markets, there is little progress.  There are no insurance markets or
markets for financial intermediation.  Banking is characterized by Cuban economists to be at a primitive
level of development, Echevarria (1997).  Even the proposal for banking reform put forth by Carranza,Gutierrez and Monreal (1998) does not envisage that interest rates would playa role in the allocation of
credit to state enterprises, which represent the bulk of the economy.  Banking credit financed only
0.7% of investment by the State in 1997, Everleny Perez-Villanueva (1998). 
With respect to the new nonagricultural private sector, which consists of wholly owned foreign
enterprises, joint ventures and a small number of ‘sociedades anonimas’ controlled by the
nomenclature, these enterprises increased both their share of employment (2.2% to 3.%) and the
absolute number of workers (82,400 to 110,300) between 1994 and 1996, Anuario Estadistico, 1996. 
They have been called the star performers of the reform process by Ritter (1998).  The same author,
however, points out that Cuban nationals are not allowed to invest in them and that the out payments
for profit repatriation and interest on short-term debt have now reached high levels which compare
unfavorably to the actual amounts of annual foreign disbursements ($550 million going out versus $250
million coming in).  Ritter (1998, p.18) goes on to question the wisdom of placing so much hope on
foreign investment.  Perhaps one reason for this strategy is that foreign investment provides an important
mechanism for capturing dollars by the nomenclature.  An institutional arrangement that allows this
capture is the requirement that workers in foreign enterprises be hired through the National Employment
Agency. The latter receives payments for their wages in dollars and pays them in pesos!  With the
official exchange rate at 1$ per peso and the black market one around 1$ per 20 pesos, this agency has
one of the world’s most lucrative businesses.   
Last but not least we should consider the state sector which still comprises the bulk of the
economy (77.7% of the employed labor force in 1996).  ‘Reform’ in this sector has been slow or
nonexistent. The most recent thrust of the ‘reform’ is to cut down the contributions of their losses to the
fiscal deficit, at least on paper, through autofinancing.  Nonetheless, the treatment of interenterprisearrears, limits on the use of profits and even what accounting practices are relevant is unsettled.  Their
interactions with the banking sector is also an issue of potential concern given the recent experiences
with banking crisis in countries with weak banking systems.  Interest in ‘reform’ here seems to be
driven by the hope that projecting an image of  macroeconomic stability by reducing the fiscal deficit
will attract foreign investment.  Cuba has not made state enterprises residual claimants to their profits
despite autofinancing and, thus, has not addressed the basic incentive problems of this institutional form.
Interestingly, Everleny Perez-Villanueva (1998) reports the state enterprises in the sugar sector
as a main contributor to the fiscal deficit through their losses.  Yet, Ritter (1998, pp. 16-17) in assessing
the problems of the sugar sector writes “In effect, it has been a foreign exchange cow which has been
milked continuously with insufficient attention to sustainability.”.  The need  to capture dollars for the
nomenclature gets in the way of even the very limited reform in the state sector.  
V. Concluding Remarks.
Cuba’s economic ‘reforms’ are at a standstill or in clear retrogression and so are the economic
benefits that the majority of the population could derive from economic reforms.  This outcome is not an
accident, but the result of a conscious attempt by the Cuban leadership to maintain absolute political
control. It seems to have two basic policies in the economic realm. One is  adopting economic
mechanisms that yield control of foreign exchange for the leadership, which allows them to buy the
support of the elite that makes-up its power base and throw some crumbs to the rest (in dissident
circles the crumbs are known as la jabita, la merienda and la propina). The other one is rejecting
mechanisms that provide permanent and independent access to wealth creation for anyone that is not a
member of the nomenclature, and even to some who think they are members.  The end of February1999 brought us a law, promulgated by the Cuban government, designed to eliminate the little political
space that existed for internal dissent.  Not surprisingly this law, which is known in Cuba as  “La Ley
Mordaza”, played a role in leading to the recent condemnation of Cuba’s human rights violations by the
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